Cuchlainn et Alain,
avant ma conclusion, je cherche d'abord de citer quelques paragraphes qui sont relevants pour mon opinion.
http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviati ... llapse.htmThe French air force began rearmament in 1934 as part of Plan I, which called for the production of 1,343 new aircraft. Nevertheless, the assembly of such a force was doomed from the beginning. In the mid 1930s, the French aircraft industry was more one of scattered complexes rather than a cohesion structure. One in which up to forty organizations had input in nearly all aspects of aircraft design, development and production. While at the same time competing for those precious newly designated funds. As they originally were setup, France’s aircraft industry was not structured to handle such big orders, thus the structure needed to be altered which would cause further delays in production. Those delays had an adverse effect on the air force’s rearmament effort. Because of them, most of France’s developed aircraft from the late 1930s came through a narrow technological window. One which prevented the newly developed aircraft from achieving its top technological capability thus making them obsolete before they reached operational status.
C'est ça que vous avez déja plusieurs fois mentioné, Cuchlainn.
The problem was compounded by the type of airplanes the French government began to order. Plan I called for the construction of multirole air platforms capable of performing as bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. Instead of building dedicated platforms, the French government invested on various single type planes. Such aircraft were indeed able to carry out, on a pedestrian basis, each of the various types of missions they were called for, but they could not to distinguish themselves in any single one of them. The decision to develop such platforms was a painful compromise between the Army, the newly formed Air Force and the government. Many inside the air force believed, with passion, in Giulio Douhet’s strategic theory which called for the destruction of the enemy’s economic strength by destroying its infrastructure. While on the other hand, the Army’s top brass desired that the new air force serve as a supporting package rather than an independent unit.
Le type d'avion multifunctionaire déja mentioné dans vos discussions est ici commentarié. C'était en effet un compromis douloureux entre l'armée de terre, l'armée de l'air formée récemment, et le gouvernement. Plusieurs dans la force de l'air croyaient avec passion dans le théorie stratégique de Giulio Dohet. Mais au même temps l'armée de terre voulait (comme les Allemands (mon interjection)) l'aviation comme support et pas indépendant d'eux. (c'est comme ça que le "close air support" n'était pas possible à ce moment (mon interjection))
The other factor was the gradual change in the air force’s air doctrine. In France, Nazi Germany role in the Spanish Civil War was a topic of heated discussions, especially its air component. In Spain, elements of the Luftwaffe provided constant close air support to Franco’s ground troops, paving the way for Franco to assume control of the country. This fact was not lost on French commanders, many of whom began to move the air force from an strategic bomber force to a more robust air-ground combat arrangement. Close air support was now France main air doctrine. Although a change in doctrine was made, the air force was painfully slow to match doctrine with hardware. A clear example of this “operational deficiency” was the fact that France never developed a top flight dive bomber aircraft, a platform that proved highly successful over the Spanish countryside.
Alors après la guerre civile espagnol où on a vu le "close air support" des Allemands, la doctrine française était graduellement transformé vers "close air support". Mais la transformation dans les types d'avions, n'est que lente.
(mon interjection: ça correspond avec la période de Guy La Chambre mentioné dans l'article de l'Américain Kirkland, commenté plus haut?)
The newly developed Plan V was twice scaled up between the painful Munich conference and the German invasion of the low countries. Nearly four billion francs were invested in the air force from January 1938 through to the end of combat activities in June 1940. In charge of Plan V was a brilliant engineer named Albert Caquot. Beside having impeccable engineering credentials, Caquot had one other trait, coveted by many, superb managerial skills. Skills France sorely needed at the time. Caquot immersed himself in the task at hand and by late 1938 he had the French aircraft industry producing new airframes at a rate of 41 units per month, peaking at 298 planes per month in September 1939.
What Caquot and his team did was nothing less than remarkable. Almost overnight, France had consolidated its scattered aircraft industry and developed an integrated skilled workforce. On August 23rd the French high command met to discuss the state of the air rearmament. The ultra conservative General Maurice Gamelin, France’s top military commander, spoke eloquently about the country’s ability to match Germany step by step on all dimensions of combat.
Enfin avec le plan cinq et Caquot les Franças avaient une production cohérente qui équivalait l'allemande.
Everything seemed to be moving upwards. Plan V was to be revised two times before the declaration of war and the factories were turning out airframes at a record pace, but hidden behind the numbers was tragic situation. Mobilization had an adverse effect on rearmament, specially, the air component. Because a high percentage of the skilled workforce was activated, the factories were deprived of their expertise as well as sheer manpower needed to keep up the rearmament pace.
By late 1939, aircraft production had actually fallen prompting Caquot’s resignation in January 1940. Also by that time, the aircraft industry was producing planes at such a high rate that spare parts manufactures just could not keep up with demands. The situation was so grave that after the disaster of Munich, Daladier send his trusted adviser Jean Monnet to the United States with a simple order to buy as many airframes as he could get “his hands on”. Monnet responded with a large gesture. By February 1939, the prominent French banker had placed orders for 550 aircraft. Later that spring, Daladier made Monnet the head of the powerful Anglo-French Purchasing Committee. Vested with new powers and an even bigger cache of funds, Monnet arranged for the acquisition of 4500 new airframes. Unfortunately for France, the delivery of all these newly purchased aircraft was painfully slow. When the Germans finally attacked, only 200 of these units were actually deployed and ready for combat.
Deux inconvénients pour le plan. Par la mobilisation les travailleurs callifiés manquaient et immobolisaient la production et par la grande quantité d'avions qui quitaient les usines les entrepreneurs de pièces de rechange ne pouvaient plus suivre (alors question de rendre les avions opérationelles en cas de guerre).
Alors Jean Monnet était envoyé en Amérique pour acheter des avions américaines. Jusqu'à 4.500. Mais le 10 Mai seulement 200 étaient déployés et prêt pour le combat.
Ce que je trouve étrange, que l'auteur ne mentionne pas le manque de pilotes qualifiés. Dans d'autres articles ce fait est maintes fois noté.
J'ai des difficultés pour voir mon texte que je tape dans le cadre de la fenêtre "répondre" et quand je retourne après des rencherches dans ce même cadre le lettres sont deux à trois fois aggrandis et quand je tape sur aperçu et la fenêtre de aperçu arrive le format des letres est de nouveau normal. J'essayerai avec un nouveau message si ça reste le même. Ce message est d'ailleurs déja assez long.
Cordialement et avec estime pour vous deux,
Paul.