Merci pour les réponses...
Entretemps le sujet du fil que j'ai mentioné est dévié du message original: quoi si les alliés ont poussé pour le Ruhr dès le 3 Septembre, vers des questions de stratégie française en 1939/1940.
Je ne sais pas si ce n'est pas hors sujet ici, mais faute de trouver d'autrs fil sur le sujet je demande quand même des vérifications pour le sujet suivant...
J'ai lu "La chute de la Troisième République" de Shirer en anglais. et je n'ai pas retrouvé ce que un contributeur dit dans la séquence suivante concernant Daladier, Gamelin et Reynaud
http://historum.com/speculative-history ... all-5.htmlThe following can be considered as incredible.
The day he was informed by an officer of french intelligence service (2d bureau, lieutnant colonel Paillole ) that most part of panzerdivisionnen were located face to the ardennes other main french generals (Georges, Billote) accepted his plan in a not enthusiastic way.
French intelligence was informed that there were, at least,6 panzer in this sector and guessed that german planned to attack there, then allies still had an excellent occasion of victory.
It was the 21 march, almost 2 months before the beginning of german's attack.
Gamelin behaviour was very ambiguous, of course he refused to take into account information about the german's threat in the ardennes.
Certainly because he wanted to protect his carrer, but any historian Wonder if he would has been a little bit foolish.
Gamelin was more and more Under pressure.
At the same moment governement changed and Paul Reynaud became "prime minister" (president du conseil).
Paul Reynaud was an ennemy of Gamelin, he detested him and contested his competence for long years.
Paul Reynaud wanted to fire gamelin and was a tenant of armoured division.
No doubt that if gamelin changed the plan he promoted since many weeks ("manœuvre Dyle-Breda"), he would has lost definitely all credibilities, and this would has increased possibility to fire him.
If the trust in gamelin was contested for many years, he was supported in a very obstinate manner by Edouard Daladier one of the main french politician of 1930's and other politicians (president of the republic Lebrun).
Paul Reynaud took the power in march the 21 with only 1 voice of majority, therefore he couldn't fire Daladier and Gamelin who still had many supporters.
He wanted to do it since march and tried again to do it in the beginning of april in a very controversial government meeting cause the "failure of Norway" (Gamelin didn't guess anything about german's intention) but Daladier always defended him: "the worst day of my life" Gamelin.
Eventually nothing changed up to the 10 may despite the will of the "president of the Council" and the rise of the doubt about the gamelin's ability to command and german's attack trough the Ardennes (general Corap leader of IXth army, general Huntziger leader of the IId army, both located face the Ardennes).
Gamelin was fired the 19 may 1940, his last "act" as commander was a memorable meal in the morning of this day where he attempted to persuade others that general Georges had the complete responsability of the military disaster and that it was time he intervened in order "to see what he could do"
This was the end of the carrer of the very bureaucrat general Gamelin.
After WWII he wrote a very long book ("servir") were he defended his performance as commander in 1940.
Le 21 Mars un Lieutenant Colonel Paillole (deuxième bureau de la service secrète française) informe que le grand part des divisions blindées allemandes étaient localisées face aux Ardennes. Autres génerals, comme Billote dans le contexte de celà n'acceptaient guerre le plan Dyle-Breda.
La service secrète française estimait qu'on avait 6 divisions allemandes face aux Ardennes et pour ça pensait que l'attaque plus important va se développer par là.
Gamelin refusait de prendre au sérieux l'attaque par les Ardennes, mais Gamelin venait de plus en plus sous pression.
Paul Reynaud devenait président du conseil 21 Mars.
Paul Reynaud était un ennemi de Gamelin et le détestait et contestait sa compétence pendant des longues années.
Reyaud voulait déposer Gamelin et il était un favori de la division blindée.
Parce que Gamelin avait des supporters assez importants comme Daladier et d'autres comme le président de la république Lebrun, Reynaud n'avait pas le poids pour lui déposer.
Et peut-être pas de doute si Gamelin avait changé le plan Dyle-Breda, qu'il a promû pendant plusieures semaines il aurait perdu définitivement toute sa crédibilité et la chance pour lui déposer aurait augmenté.
Et rien n'avait changé jusque le 10 Mai. Et ultérieurement il est alors déposé le 19 Mai.
Ma question: Peut on vérifier les affirmations d'en haut.
La service secrète française qui savait que la grande attaque va se développer dans les Ardennes?
L'hésitation de Gamelin pour protéger sa carrière de ne pas dévier du plan Dyle-Breda et de nier les indices de l'attaque par les Ardennes?
Cordialement, Paul.